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A historical review of in-vessel melt retention (IVR) is given, which is a severe accident mitigation mea-
sure extensively applied in Generation III pressurized water reactors (PWRs). The idea of IVR actually 
originated from the back-fitting of the Generation II reactor Loviisa VVER-440 in order to cope with 
the core-melt risk. It was then employed in the new deigns such as Westinghouse AP1000, the Korean 
APR1400 as well as Chinese advanced PWR designs HPR1000 and CAP1400. The most influential phe-
nomena on the IVR strategy are in-vessel core melt evolution, the heat fluxes imposed on the vessel 
by the molten core, and the external cooling of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). For in-vessel melt 
evolution, past focus has only been placed on the melt pool convection in the lower plenum of the RPV; 
however, through our review and analysis, we believe that other in-vessel phenomena, including core 
degradation and relocation, debris formation, and coolability and melt pool formation, may all contrib-
ute to the final state of the melt pool and its thermal loads on the lower head. By looking into previous 
research on relevant topics, we aim to identify the missing pieces in the picture. Based on the state of 
the art, we conclude by proposing future research needs. 
© 2016 THE AUTHORS. Published by Elsevier LTD on behalf of Chinese Academy of Engineering and 
Higher Education Press Limited Company. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1.  Introduction
Nuclear power safety involves estimating the risks posed by 
one or more nuclear power plants (NPPs) to the public at large 
and the efforts to reduce these risks. The populace of most con-
cern is that residing in the vicinity of an NPP; populations in 
other locations that could be affected by an accident in an NPP 
are also considered. The basic goal of nuclear power safety is to 
ensure that an NPP will not contribute significantly to individual 
and societal health risks. This goal translates to the prevention of 
the release of radioactivity into the environment from the power 
plant. A complementary aim is to prevent damage to the plant 
and to protect the personnel at the plant from injury or death in 
an accident.
To meet this safety goal, the general configuration of a pressur-
ized water reactor (PWR) plant provides three important physical 
barriers to the release of fission products into the environment: 
the cladding on the fuel element, which contains the fission 
products generated in the fuel; the reactor vessel, which contains 
all the fuel elements forming a reactor core; and the leak-tight 
containment, which is intended to keep any fission products in-
side the containment from escaping to the environment. Assuring 
the integrity of each of these physical barriers in any accident 
scenario becomes the corner stone of the defense-in-depth ap-
proach which is extensively employed in nuclear safety against 
the release of radioactivity to the environment. During a severe 
accident, the occurrence of reactor core meltdown may cause the 
first one or two physical barriers to fail, leading to the release of a 
certain fraction of fission products (gaseous and solid in the form 
of aerosol) to the pressure-bearing containment. The fission prod-
ucts may leak into the environment if this last barrier also fails. 
Thus, one can say that the ultimate goal of nuclear power safety is 
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to maintain the containment integrity.
According to the state-of-the-art understanding of severe acci-
dents in a PWR [1], the main threats to containment integrity are 
as follows: 
(1) Direct containment heating (DCH);
(2) Ex-vessel steam explosion (EVE);
(3) Hydrogen combustion (H2C);
(4) Containment long term over-pressurization (LOP);
(5) Containment bypass and leakage (CBL); and
(6) Basemat melt penetration (BMP).
For the Generation III PWR designs, the above items (1)–(5) 
are taken care mainly through careful design, construction, oper-
ation, and accident management, in order to let their risks to be 
reduced to as low as reasonably possible. The last item, BMP, con-
cerns the thermo-chemical attack of the decay-heated core melt 
(corium), which may melt through the reactor pressure vessel 
(RPV) and then the containment basemat if melt coolability is not 
achieved. The corium coolability (i.e., preventing melt-through 
of physical barriers) has been recognized as the “Achilles-heel” 
of the Generation II or earlier PWR designs [2]. The solutions 
adopted by Generation III reactors are basically divided into two 
categories: in-vessel melt retention (IVR) or ex-vessel melt reten-
tion (EVR), corresponding to the termination of a severe accident 
in the RPV or in the containment, respectively. The key strategy 
of IVR is to arrest and confine the corium in the lower head of the 
RPV by flooding the reactor pit (cavity), while EVR collects and 
cools the corium ejected from the RPV in a core catcher placed in 
the containment. Well-known core catcher designs include the 
melt spreading and cooling compartment deployed in the con-
tainment of the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) [3] of AREVA, 
and the crucible-like vessel installed under the RPV of the Russian 
VVER [4]. EPR plants are currently under construction in Finland, 
France, and China. The VVER-1000 plant with a core catcher (AES-
91) was first built in China and came into operation in 2007.
IVR is preferred in Chinese designs of advanced PWRs: It is 
adopted in the Generation III and Generation III+ PWR designs, 
and it is also one of the important features of AP1000, which is 
under construction at two NPP sites in China, and intended to be 
intensively built in the near future. Therefore, this paper focuses 
a historical review of IVR development, and afterward provides a 
recommendation of future research needs in order to improve the 
credibility of IVR and enable its application in new PWR designs. 
This historical review of IVR along with state-of-the-art knowl-
edge of severe accidents in PWRs, serves as a basis and rationale 
for identifying further research needs.
2.  History of in-vessel melt retention (IVR)
It should be noted that in-vessel melt coolability and retention 
includes three general concepts: ① quenching of the core in situ; 
② coolability of in-vessel particulate beds; and ③ coolability of 
the in-vessel melt pool. The first concept, which is the best op-
portunity to catch the core during its heating-up stage, refers to 
the introduction of water into the core as soon as the emergency 
core cooling system (ECCS) is recovered. Core quenching is not a 
straightforward management action since the steam formed may 
aggravate the accident by increasing the zircaloy oxidation (lead-
ing to the addition of oxidation heat to the core and the release 
of hydrogen). The key action to reduce the cladding temperature 
quickly and reduce hydrogen production is to add a large volume 
of water at a rapid rate. The addition of water to the very hot core 
can create a particulate debris bed due to the crumbling of some 
of the hot fuel rods that are chilled by cold water. A particulate 
debris bed is also formed when the melt from the core drops into 
the lower head full of water. The coolability of such debris beds 
provides the second best opportunity to terminate the accident, 
since the porous media is much more amenable to cooling than 
a molten pool. If reflooding the core is impossible, the last resort 
is to realize the coolability of a molten corium pool in the lower 
head through external cooling of the RPV. This is the IVR strategy 
to be discussed hereafter. It should be recognized that the water 
circuit required for the external cooling of the vessel should be 
separate from the water circuits that add water to the vessel, and 
that it must function even in the case of a station blackout.
2.1.  Principle of IVR
Fig. 1 shows a conceptual picture of IVR, in which the core 
melt is finally relocated into the lower head and forms a pool of 
molten materials heated volumetrically by the decay heat, while 
the outer surface of the RPV is submerged either completely or at 
least to a level above the lower head. The coolant flow (normally 
driven by natural circulation) through the external surface of the 
RPV keeps the vessel wall cool enough to prevent it from creep 
failure.
The IVR strategy therefore requires that the decay heat of the 
melt pool be removed by coolant flow outside the vessel. This 
translates to the rationale that the angular heat flux (qw) imposed 
by the melt pool to the vessel wall should not exceed the lim-
it of the external cooling capacity, that is, the critical heat flux 
(CHF) of boiling at all points around the lower head, see Fig. 2. 
Otherwise the integrity of the vessel will be lost, sooner or later, 
due to a boiling crisis and subsequent escalation of vessel wall 
Fig. 1.  Sketch of in-vessel melt retention (IVR) by external cooling.
Fig. 2.  A comparison of critical heat flux (CHF) and qw in IVR.
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temperature. Although the idea sounds quite simple, it is a for-
midable task to prove IVR with high confidence. The reason for 
this difficulty is the challenge of precisely determining either the 
heat flux or the CHF, and especially the heat flux (qw) of the melt 
pool convection which is largely affected by in-vessel severe acci-
dent phenomena and accident scenarios. Due to the uncertainties 
in the understanding of the physical phenomena and accident 
scenarios, an integrated deterministic/probabilistic approach is 
introduced, to account for the uncertainties in the assessment of 
the IVR problem [5] (more details are provided below). The solu-
tion is a comparison between probabilities of the heat flux qw and 
the CHF, as shown in Fig. 3, where Fig. 3(a) represents a successful 
case while Fig. 3(b) represents an unsuccessful one.
2.2.  IVR of VVER-440
The IVR concept was first proposed in 1989 by Professor Theo-
fanous at the University of California at Santa Barbara (UCSB) as 
a backfit for the VVER-440 reactors of the Loviisa NPP in Finland 
[5]. Since the Loviisa containments have relatively low pressure 
rating and are quite vulnerable to melt attack on the basemat, IVR 
was conceived during deliberations on a safety upgrade of the 
plant. The idea is supported by the unique features of the Loviisa 
reactors: low power density; large water volumes in the primary 
and secondary circuits, which delay the accident progression; 
and ice-condenser containments which ensure a flooded reactor 
cavity due to the melting of ice in most severe accident scenari-
os. The feasibility of the concept was then jointly investigated by 
Professor Theofanous and his colleagues at UCSB, as well as by 
researchers at IVO (the utility company of Loviisa, currently called 
Fortum). The case for the IVR of the Loviisa plant was submitted 
to the Finnish regulatory authority—Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK), and its implementation was approved by STUK 
in December 1995.
Both analytical and experimental studies were performed in 
the extensive research program related to the IVR assessment 
of the Loviisa plant. To determine the heat flux of the melt pool 
convection in the lower head, the COPO and ACOPO experiments 
were carried out by IVO and UCSB, respectively, and correlations 
were developed to predict the heat flux profile around the lower 
head. A stratified melt pool having a metal layer above an oxide 
layer was also considered in the analysis; with the focusing effect, 
the maximum heat flux from the metal layer is 680 kW·m–2. The 
ULPU facility built at UCSB was employed to investigate the ex-
ternal cooling of the RPV, and it was found that the CHF is not less 
than 1200 kW·m–2 for a configuration similar to that of the Loviisa 
plant. Since differences exist between experimentation and reac-
tor application (scaling, simulant vs. prototypic materials, limited 
scenarios, etc.), the risk-oriented accident analysis methodology 
(ROAAM) originally developed by Professor Theofanous et al. [6] 
was employed in the synthesis of the research results to demon-
strate the success of the IVR strategy. The key elements of the 
ROAAM include a separate treatment of aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties; bounding/conservative treatment of intangibles of 
epistemic uncertainties beyond the reach of reasonably verifiable 
quantification; and the use of external experts in review rather 
than in primary quantification. The conclusion was that the ther-
mal loads on the RPV wall from the molten corium pool are far 
below the level for the occurrence of a boiling crisis on the outer 
surface of the wall such that melt-through of the RPV is physically 
unreasonable in all scenarios in which the reactor cavity is flooded. 
The safety margins are large, so that the undefined uncertainties 
will not endanger the overall conclusion for the Loviisa plant [5].
2.3.  IVR of AP600 and AP1000
The AP600 reactor is an evolutionary Generation III PWR de-
sign by Westinghouse, although it has never been built (its suc-
cessor, AP1000, is fast approaching its first completion in China). 
The first driving idea behind AP600 is to achieve passive safety, 
employing natural forces rather than plant control and operator 
intervention, particularly during abnormal transients and acci-
dents. The principal objective is to meet the increasingly strin-
gent regulatory requirements for plant safety, including severe 
accident prevention and mitigation. The second driving idea is to 
reduce the “footprint” of an NPP, by decreasing the materials and 
equipment, and reducing the construction cost and schedule. 
Among the many features of the AP600 design are passive 
cooling systems, including passive core cooling, passive contain-
ment cooling, and an IVR similar to that of Loviisa. The IVR of 
AP600 uses the water from the in-containment refueling water 
storage tank (IRWST) to flood the reactor cavity from the bottom, 
and submerge the reactor vessel up to its cold-leg and hot-leg 
nozzles. The annulus between the vessel wall and its insulation 
(or baffle/cavity wall) serves as the riser for the two-phase flow 
around the vessel. The characteristics of the flow path are crucial 
to the natural circulation flowrate and the boiling-induced two-
phase flow and heat transfer (e.g., CHF) on the outer surface of 
the vessel.
In contrast to the Loviisa plant which needed backfitting 
measures (e.g., some changes in RPV insulation) to achieve IVR, 
the AP600 reactor had the advantage of having an optimal IVR de-
signed for it (e.g., placing the insulation and baffle for better natu-
ral circulation) through interactions with its supporting research. 
The comprehensive study of the IVR for the AP600 reactor [7] 
was also carried out by Professor Theofanous and his colleagues 
almost during the same period as the IVR study of Loviisa. Thus, 
the two studies were carried out largely in parallel—even sharing 
some of the experimental work and personnel [5]. 
The study of the AP600 IVR [7] started from scenario descrip-
Fig. 3.  Heat flux distribution functions. (a) Successful case; (b) unsuccessful case.
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tions; in particular, how the melt relocates from the core region 
to the lower head. It then analyzed the possibility of vessel failure 
due to ① a melt jet attack on some particular vessel location and 
② a steam explosion generated by the melt entry into the water 
pool in the lower head—although this possibility was concluded 
to be remote. Finally, the study focused on determining the ther-
mal load on the lower head and the CHF by the external cooling 
of the RPV. In addition to the insights from other research, ACOPO 
and ULPU-2000 experiments were carried out at UCSB to investi-
gate the angular heat flux distribution and the CHF, respectively. 
The ROAAM approach was also employed in the IVR study of 
AP600 for the synthesis of its results (the final assessment for 
certification). Special attention was paid to the influence of melt 
pool composition and stratification on the thermal loading on the 
vessel wall. The metal layer of AP600 would be thick, providing 
a sufficient margin between the focused heat flux and the CHF 
outside. It was found that the heat flux varied with angle, peaking 
near the equator of the lower head. Fortunately, the CHF of the 
external cooling also reached its highest value (1.5 MW·m–2) near 
the equator. In most considered cases, the ratio of the imposed 
heat flux to the CHF was below 0.6, and thus the major conclusion 
was that thermally-induced failure of an externally-cooled AP600 
vessel is physically unreasonable. The final design of AP600 was 
approved in September 1998, and the design certification was 
issued by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) in De-
cember 1999, although there was no special certification of the 
IVR concept by the USNRC.
Following this success story, the IVR strategy was incorpo-
rated into the AP1000 design by Westinghouse. This design is 
more or less an enlarged version of AP600, with a power rating of 
1000 MWe. Due to the higher power generation, further work was 
performed on the technology and methodology of IVR, particular-
ly for the enhancement of the CHF on the outer surface of the ves-
sel, to obtain a sufficient safety margin to cover the uncertainties. 
To promote IVR, the AP1000 has the following particular design 
features: ① The reactor coolant system (RCS) is equipped with a 
multistage, diverse, redundant automatic depressurization system 
(ADS) to reduce the pressure loading on the reactor vessel wall; 
② the lower head of the RPV does not have bottom-mounted 
instrumentation, to eliminate the potential of a penetration fail-
ure (which tends to occur much earlier in time than vessel creep 
failure, if it occurs); ③ the lower core support plate and lower 
internals sit low within the reactor vessel lower plenum to ensure 
that they can be melted by the oxide core debris relocated there, 
creating a thick metal layer to reduce the focusing effect; and 
④ a dedicated baffle system surrounding the lower head, made of 
reflective metal insulation, is designed to form a cooling annulus 
to enhance natural circulation flow velocities and, as a result, the 
CHF. Through the ULPU-2400 experiment [8], which scaled the 
external cooling flow path of AP1000, it was found that the CHF 
near the equator of the lower head could reach 2 MW·m–2, which 
was considerably larger than the maximum thermal load for 
AP1000, estimated as 1.3 MW·m–2 [1]. An independent analysis [9] 
implied that the thermal load may exceed the CHF under some 
extreme conditions (e.g., a thin metal layer above the oxide pool, 
see Fig. 4(a)) but that the probability was very low. Additional 
parametric calculations were performed for a three-layer config-
uration on considering the findings of the MASCA projects [10,11]; 
this configuration involved a molten oxide pool sandwiched be-
tween a bottom, heavy metallic layer and a top, light metallic lay-
er (Fig. 4(b)). The results showed that the heat flux of the bottom 
layer remained well below the CHF from the ULPU-2400 tests. 
The final design of AP1000 was approved in September 2004, and 
the design certification was issued by the USNRC in January 2006. 
China subsequently started building four AP1000 reactors at two 
sites in 2008.
2.4.  IVR of APR1400
The IVR strategy was also adopted by the Korean design of 
the 1400 MWe Advanced Power Reactor (APR1400). In addition 
to external reactor vessel cooling (ERVC), the APR1400 system 
design plans include the ability to simultaneously flood the metal 
layer with water inside the vessel after the RCS depressurization; 
a action that could—hopefully—remove sufficient heat from the 
upper face of the metal layer to reduce the focused heat flux on 
the vessel wall to values lower than the CHF (Fig. 5 [12]). A ded-
icated water system has been installed in the reactor, enabling 
water injection to reach the melt pool in the lower head at the 
appropriate time [1]. It must be pointed out that bringing water 
into the extremely hot vessel at such a point in time is not an easy 
matter, and would need a comprehensive evaluation and perhaps 
a demonstration.
In order to understand whether the currently-proposed ERVC 
and additional enhancements could provide sufficient heat re-
moval for higher-power reactors (up to 1500 MWe), a collabora-
tive effort was completed in which the Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL) and Pennsylvania State University (PSU) in the US, and the 
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Seoul Na-
tional University (SNU) in Korea jointly investigated the ERVC en-
Fig. 4.  Schematic of the melt pool configurations in the lower head [9]. (a) Two layers; (b) three layers.
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hancements and an in-vessel core catcher (IVCC) [13]. The study 
included four tasks: ① calculations conducted by SCDAP/RELAP5 
to define representative bounding late-phase melt conditions; 
② the design of an IVCC; ③ ERVC enhancements; and ④ an as-
sessment of the improved safety margin obtained from the design 
modifications. The study chose APR1400 as the reference reactor. 
Several experimental facilities and state-of-the-art analysis codes 
in the US and Korea were employed to investigate options that 
could enhance ERVC and IVCC performance. The main findings 
and conclusions were as follows.
(1) The average thermal loads on the APR1400 lower head were 
estimated to range from 0.147 MW·m–2 to 1.64 MW·m–2 for 
the considered accident scenarios, in the absence of any 
ERVC enhancements. The flowrate of natural circulation 
obtained in the HERMES-HALF facility (a scaled flow path 
of APR1400 ERVC, injecting air to simulate the boiling ef-
fect) could be up to 200 kg·s–1, at which the CHF near the 
equator of the lower head could reach 1.3−1.45 MW·m–2, 
based on the SULTAN [14] experiment. Hence, it was ob-
served that employing ERVC alone, without the injection 
of water into the vessel, is insufficient to remove the decay 
heat of the melt pool in the lower head and to assure the 
integrity of the vessel. The study did not mention the in-
fluence of top cooling by water injection, but studies else-
where indicate that top-flooding alone may only be able to 
cool down a 100−200 mm thick melt layer.
(2) To support the design of the IVCC (Fig. 6 [13]) for enhancing 
coolability, experiments were carried out on the GAMMA- 
2D facility (a slice of semi-circular vessel with outer di-
ameter of 500 mm) to investigate the gap cooling and the 
CHFs at atmospheric pressure which were measured as 
ranging from 50 MW·m–2 to 250 MW·m–2, corresponding 
to gap sizes of 1 mm, 3 mm, and 5 mm. The melt attack on 
the core catcher and the refractory coating on its surface 
were also investigated, but its survival ability, and influ-
ence on the RCS have not yet been determined. The IVCC 
and the water injection into the vessel belong to in-vessel 
cooling enhancement measures.
(3) One ERVC enhancement is to modify the originally pro-
posed insulation as shown in Fig. 7 [13] (adding the insula-
tion marked in dark grey), in order to streamline the flow 
for more effective cooling. This idea is similar to the IVR 
upgrade from AP600 to AP1000, which redesigned the baf-
fles to obtain a higher CHF. The relevant tests performed 
on the SBLB facility (with a hemispherical representation 
of 1/5 scale lower head) showed that the CHF was en-
hanced by around 20% near the equator of the hemispheri-
cal head.
(4) Another ERVC enhancement is to apply a micro-porous 
coating on the outer surface of the head using aluminum 
or copper. It was found that the CHF near the equator of 
the coated head was around 80% higher than that of the 
plain head. The micro-porous aluminum coating appeared 
to be much more durable than the micro-porous copper 
coating, since it remained intact even after many cycles of 
steady-state boiling.
(5) When the modified insulation and the vessel coating 
were applied together, the integral effect on the CHF near 
the equator was an increase by a factor of 2.2. It appears 
that ERVC with the use of vessel coating and a modified 
insulation structure could provide sufficient cooling for 
high-power reactors such as APR1400. 
The severe accident mitigation strategy of the Korean APR1400 
reactor does not appear to be definitively set, and may undergo 
changes. The questions of how to interpret the experimental data 
from the small-scale tests and how to apply the coating to the 
prototypical vessel are still unclear. While the standard APR1400 
version uses IVR, it is notable that its modified version for the Fig. 5.  Schematic of IVR in APR1400 [12].
Fig. 6.  Conceptual design of the in-vessel core catcher for APR1400 [13].
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European market will have an ex-vessel core catcher similar to 
the basemat-internal melt arrest and coolability (BiMAC) device 
placed under the RPV of economic simplified boiling water reac-
tor (ESBWR)—a boiling water reactor (BWR) design by GE-Hitachi 
Nuclear Energy [15].
2.5.  IVR of CAP1400 and HPR1000
After the Fukushima accidents, the Chinese nuclear authority 
took actions to introduce more stringent requirements for nucle-
ar power safety, and new reactors are expected to accomplish the 
“practical elimination of large radioactive release.” Severe acci-
dent prevention and mitigation measures are paramount to reach 
such a goal. The IVR strategy is preferred in Chinese Generation 
III PWR designs, following the import of AP1000. HPR1000 and 
CAP1400 are two such advanced PWRs.
The CAP1400 reactor has a power rating of 1400 MWe and 
was developed by the State Nuclear Power Technology Company 
(SNPTC) of China. It essentially inherited the design philosophy 
and features of AP1000. Due to its enlarged capacity, a considera-
ble number of research activities have been carried out by SNPTC 
and its collaborators, including the design and qualification of 
the IVR. An ULPU-like facility scaled to the CAP1400 was set up 
at Shanghai Jiaotong University to demonstrate the heat removal 
capability for external cooling of the reactor vessel. The site of 
a pilot plant of CAP1400 has been determined and construction 
work may begin in 2016.
The HPR1000, also called Hualong One, is an advanced PWR 
with a power of 1000 MWe, jointly designed by the China Nation-
al Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and the China Guangdong Nuclear 
Power Holding Corp. Ltd. (CGNPC). This reactor also has the ad-
vantage of passive safety, being equipped with a passive contain-
ment cooling system (PCCS) and a passive residual heat removal 
system (PRS). However, the IVR strategy of HPR1000 has an “active 
plus passive” feature, which means that the external cooling of 
the vessel is driven either by a pump (active) or by a gravity head 
(passive). The idea behind this concept is to increase the redun-
dancy and safety margin. CNNC and CGNPC have accomplished 
many R&D studies for HPR1000, incorporating lessons learned 
from their experiences in design/construction/operating of the 
existing PWR fleet in China. Construction of the first HPR1000 
plant started in May 2015.
Regarding IVR applications in Chinese reactors, extensive re-
search efforts (e.g., Refs. [16–18]) have been carried out in differ-
ent organizations in China, but most data are not yet available to 
the public, due to commercial confidentiality.
3.  Future research needs
From the above descriptions, one can see that the qualifica-
tion of an IVR measure directly depends on two parameters: the 
heat flux incident from the melt pool on the vessel wall, and the 
heat removal capacity of the external cooling of the vessel (i.e., 
the CHF). The uncertainty in determining the CHF of boiling on 
the downward-facing vessel surface is relatively low, since one 
can perform an experimental investigation on the problem with 
a well-scaled mock-up. Recent efforts are directed toward CHF 
enhancements by designing an optimal insulation structure sur-
rounding the vessel, streamlining the flow path, and increasing 
the driving head. CHF enhancements of coated and structured 
surfaces as well as coolant with surfactant or nano fluid were 
also investigated and interesting results were obtained; how-
ever, the feasibility of their effectiveness for a prototypical RPV 
during its life-time of perhaps 60–80 years is still an open ques-
tion.
There are other uncertainties which mainly come from the 
incident heat flux during the core melt progression to the vessel 
wall, since in principle all the in-vessel melt progression and 
phenomena affect it. The Three Mile Island nuclear reactor unit 2 
(TMI-2) accident itself provided a vivid example of other possible 
modes of vessel failure during the late phase of in-vessel accident 
progression for a PWR [1]. It was found (later) that the vessel wall 
had almost reached the creeping temperature, while the vessel 
was full of water. Somehow (it is not known exactly why) the ves-
sel wall cooled down to lower temperatures and vessel integrity 
was maintained. In this context, of particular interest are: the for-
mation of a large molten pool within the core and the collapse of 
a large portion of the rods above the pool (forming a debris bed), 
and the partial corium relocation toward the lower head. Fig. 8 [7] 
illustrates such an intermediate state of the core-melt progres-
sion before its final steady state, which was used as the bounding 
configuration (Fig. 4) in the past assessment of IVR. Questions 
may be raised when experts review the bounding configuration 
because of knowledge gaps on forming the final configuration. 
Below, we have attempted to give a brief review of the current 
understanding on debris formation, remelting, the vulnerability 
of instrument guide tube (IGT) penetrations, and molten pool be-
havior, all of which play a role in the evolution of the final state of 
the debris and melt pool in the lower head. 
Fig. 7.  Schematic of the enhanced insulation [13]. Fig. 8.  Intermediate state of melt progression before final steady state [7].
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3.1.  Debris formation
The core melt that is relocated into the lower head may first 
form a debris bed due to fragmentation on its settlement in the 
water pool. The fuel-coolant interaction (FCI) may also lead to 
a steam explosion. Table 1 shows data from some FARO tests 
[19,20] investigating corium jet breakup and quench during the 
penetration of molten corium into a water pool. Most of the tests 
employed more than 100 kg of a melt mixture of 80% UO2-20% 
ZrO2 in a saturated water pool, meaning that they are mainly de-
signed for the in-vessel particulate debris formation case. It was 
found that the debris did not uniformly spread on the bottom, 
and heap-like debris beds were obtained. Various particle shapes 
were observed, with sizes varying between 0.25–11 mm (Table 1 
shows the mean particle sizes). An important finding was the 
formation of cakes. The worst case for the test is L-19, where the 
cake mass is about 50% of the total corium released in the melt 
jet. The formation of cake is important to debris coolability, yet, 
the degree of its influence is not completely clear; nor is it clear 
when and how such cake formation may occur. FARO also showed 
a considerable amount of hydrogen generation, indicating that 
chemical reaction took place and affected the debris formation. 
Due to difficulties in performing and controlling experiments 
with prototypical materials, simulant materials with lower melt-
ing points were extensively employed in experiments. Such an 
approach is necessary for better understanding of the physics of 
fuel-coolant interactions. However, most existing studies (includ-
ing those with prototypical materials) were focused on the melt 
breakup mechanism, mixing, and FCI energetics. Little data exists 
on debris bed formation, which is of significance to debris bed 
coolability. The DEFOR program launched at KTH is trying to fill 
this gap [21]. A number of experiments have already been per-
formed with simulant materials providing results on particle size 
distribution similar to those observed in the FARO tests. The de-
bris agglomeration phenomenon was also observed in some tests 
using simulant materials.
Once a debris bed is formed, the debris bed coolability is im-
portant. Compared with debris bed formation, the debris bed 
coolability is much better understood due to many analyses and 
experimental studies. Although the characteristics of a prototypi-
cal debris bed and their influence on coolability are not complete-
ly clear yet [22], the current understanding is that the debris bed 
formed in the lower head is uncoolable, and will remelt.
3.2.  Debris remelting
Debris remelting is almost an unexplored research area, al-
though it is important to the formation of the final molten pool in 
the lower head. The reason for this importance is that during the 
dynamic process of debris remelting, many intermediate states 
could occur, whose thermal loads may not be always below the 
upper limit of heat removal with external cooling. For example, 
due to their lower melting points, the metallic components of the 
debris could melt first and form a liquid metal pool. The solid de-
bris (oxide components) with higher melting points would then 
be submerged in the metal pool, as illustrated in Fig. 9. This con-
figuration has a thinner metal layer above a debris bed, and may 
increase the focusing effect.
Another concern about the vessel failure in the attack of the 
debris (or melt) on the IGT is weldings and penetrations. This 
concern is for the PWRs which employ such IGTs inserted from 
the bottom of the vessel. The IGTs could have welds, inside the 
bottom head which could be vulnerable to creep failure during 
the debris heat-up. The IGTs could be possibly ejected of the 
bottom head and open a path to melt discharge from the bottom 
head, i.e., a failure of the vessel.
3.3.  Molten pool behavior
Molten pool heat transfer is a very hot research topic, since 
it determines the thermal load on the reactor vessel. Several 
experimental studies have been performed—such as COPO [23], 
ACOPO [24], SEMICO [25], and LIVE [26]—on the natural con-
vection of a volumetrically heated pool using different simulant 
liquids for representing corium, such as water, organic fluids, a 
molten binary mixture (KNO3-NaNO3), and so forth. The objec-
tive was to obtain correlations of the heat transfer coefficients, 
so as to use them in the IVR assessment. The RASPLAV [27] and 
MASCA [10] studies used prototypical materials on small scales. 
The main limitation of the existing experiments is that their 
Rayleigh numbers are much lower than the prototypical ones, 
mainly due to the small scale of the test facilities. The BALI [28] 
experiment reached a high Rayleigh number due to its radius 
being equal to that of a PWR vessel. It used organic fluid as a 
simulant for melt in its slice geometry. The recent COPRA study 
[29], sponsored by the China Nuclear Power Engineering Co. Ltd. 
(CNPE), also had a prototypical scale and used a binary mixture of 
KNO3-NaNO3. In general, since various scaled facilities and fluids 
were used in the above-mentioned studies, the experimental data 
have scatter, and care must be taken in applying them to proto-
typical conditions. There is a clear need to perform new experi-
ments that have a higher temperature and Rayleigh number.
Another issue of melt pool behavior is stratification. Since the 
metal phase (Zr and Fe) in the core melt is lighter than the oxide 
mixture (UO2-ZrO2), a two-layer melt pool was conceived first in 
the study on melt pool heat transfer. The projects RASPLAV and 
the MASCA of Organization for Economic Co-operation and De-
Table 1 
Initial conditions and key characteristics of FARO tests [19,20].
Parameter
Test
L-06 L-08 L-11 L-14 L-19 L-20 L-24 L-27 L-28
Corium mass (kg) 18 44 151 125 157 96 176 129 175
Jet diameter (cm) 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5
Water pool depth (m) 0.87 1.00 2.00 2.05 1.10 1.97 2.02 1.47 1.44
Water temperature (oC) SAT a SAT SAT SAT SAT SAT SAT SAT SAT
Initial pressure (barb) 50 58 50 50 50 20 5 5 5
Free fall (m) 1.66 1.53 1.09 1.04 1.99 1.12 1.07 Nyac Nya
Cake on bottom (kg) 6 14 0 20 80 21 Nya 31 0
Mean particle size (mm) 4.5 3.8 3.5 4.8 3.7 4.4 2.5 Nya Nya
a Saturated.
b 1 bar = 100 kPa.
c Not yet available or no data in related publications.
Fig. 9.  A possible configuration for debris bed with heat generating oxidic debris 
in a metal melt pool.
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velopment (OECD) found that element partitioning occurring due 
to chemical reactions between molten metal and oxides layers 
in a corium pool may create other melt pool configurations. For 
example, the MASCA project found that combination of the steel 
components with uranium can form a metal compound that is 
heavier than the oxide pool material. This “heavy metal” may sink 
to the bottom of the oxide-rich melt pool. This important finding 
implied the possibility of layer inversion and the formation of 
a three-layer pool with an oxide layer between the bottom and 
top metal layers in the lower head, as shown in Fig. 10. The worst 
consequence of such configuration would be a stronger focusing 
effect, since some of the steel at the top would be taken by urani-
um to the bottom of the pool. The initiator of the layer inversion 
is the non-oxidized zirconium present in the melt, but some data 
obtained in the oxidizing atmosphere (steam) showed that once 
the zirconium oxidation was complete the steel was released 
from uranium and rose back to the top of the pool [1]. Thus, our 
current understanding on corium pool composition and config-
uration is quite confused, and more research on the issue of pool 
stratification should be performed. The points to be addressed 
are: ① the partitioning kinetics and integrity/diffusion resist-
ance of crust between the layers; ② the effect of temperature 
differences between layers; ③ the history of core degradation 
and relocation into the lower plenum; and ④ oxygen diffusion 
from steam supply to the pool surface, to the interior of the melt 
pool, specifically to the heavy metal layer near the bottom of the 
pool. In this context, it is important to determine the time period 
between the formation of the heavy metal layer and the release 
of steel from the heavy metal layer. If the time period is short, 
the increased heat flux from the thinner metal layer at the top 
(being greater than the CHF on the outside surface of the vessel) 
may still not cause the vessel to fail. However, if the time period 
is long, vessel failure at the azimuthal location of the upper metal 
layer may become certain. Research needs to be performed to 
obtain sufficient knowledge about the interactive phenomenon of 
oxygen diffusion and the movement of steel between the lower 
metal layer and the upper metal layer. 
Finally, the IVR assessment also involves: ① the coupling of 
the melt pool convection, vessel wall heat conduction, and exter-
nal boiling heat transfer; ② the vessel wall creep under high tem-
perature and its interaction with the melt pool; and ③ thermo- 
chemical erosion. These factors are all poorly understood.
4.  Concluding remarks and outlook
IVR of the core melt by external cooling of the RPV is exten-
sively adopted, both in existing plants as a backfit and in new 
reactor designs (so-called Generation III reactors), including 
VVER-440, AP1000, APR1400, HPR1000, and CAP1400. IVR is 
well-accepted as an effective severe accident mitigation measure 
for the safety goal of “practical elimination of large radioactive 
release.” A large number of concerted efforts has been conducted 
worldwide to find design solutions that ensure core melt cool-
ability and retention, and also to gain knowledge regarding the 
melt-pool-induced thermal load to the vessel wall and the CHF 
of boiling on the outer surface of the RPV—two key parameters in 
the assessment of the effectiveness of IVR design. However, some 
gaps and uncertainties still exist, especially in scenarios of in- 
vessel melt evolution, for which the TMI-2 accident remains the 
sole point of reference.
We propose the following research topics to further reduce 
these uncertainties and to complete our knowledge base:
•	Melt	relocation	from	the	core	to	the	lower	plenum	with	a	fo-
cus on debris formation and remelting;
•	Debris	remelting	and	molten	pool	 formation	from	an	un-
coolable debris bed;
•	Melt	pool	convection	under	more	prototypical	conditions	
(e.g., high temperature, high Rayleigh number, oxides);
•	Mechanisms	of	melt	pool	stratification,	pool	dynamics	along	
with definitions of melt pool chemistry and oxygen diffusion 
kinetics, and possible melt pool configurations during a se-
vere accident;
•	Coupled	analysis	and	experimentation	of	the	melt	pool	con-
vection, vessel wall heat conduction, and external boiling 
heat transfer;
•	Enhancements	of	external	cooling	and	their	applications	to	
reactor designs, and other coolability enhancement mea-
sures.
We believe that ongoing research in China and abroad (such as 
the IVMR and SAFEST projects in the European Union (EU)) will 
significantly advance our confidence in the IVR strategy. It will be 
very interesting to determine, through our research efforts, the 
upper limit of IVR in terms of the power level of reactors, thus 
guiding reactor designs and facilitating the licensing process. 
Moreover, further research work will enrich our knowledge base 
on severe accident, which does not only help to certify the suit-
ability of our reactor designs and severe accident management 
strategies, but also provide solutions for important unresolved 
issues in reactor safety, thereby increasing the acceptability of 
nuclear power to the public. 
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